PNA Advisor Jonathon Granoff gives a speech at the Nobel Laureates meeting on the 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, reminding us that “our choices today will be consequential for generations to come” and that now is the time to address over-militarization in the face of our interdependent world.

Photo edited by Kim-Thao Nguyen, original picture and wording from the banner unfurled at the Nobel Laureates Meeting in Berlin on the 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall.

We have found ways of utilizing the gifts of science, technology and complex social organization to transform the natural world. From the sub-atomic realms and the basic building blocks of life all the way to the vast firmaments above us we have invented ways and means to harm and destroy ourselves. We also have the capacity to utilize these gifts wisely to expand the well-being of the entire planet. Our moments to choose are diminishing; our choices today will be consequential for generations to come.

How we use nuclear technology may be the litmus test of our collective success or demise. The military uses by states of this technology are becoming increasingly hazardous each day. Moreover, these military uses legitimize the horrific prospect of non-state actors using this technology to fulfill destructive purposes. It is necessary to use the tools of law and morality to reign in the powers we have achieved through science and technology to express our hopes, fears and aspirations.

From the Security Council of the United Nations and the leaders of nations to the intellectual elites across the globe, we have recently heard the resonance of the conscience of humanity to pursue, as President Obama has so eloquently stated in his historic April 2009 Prague speech, the “security of a nuclear weapons-free world.”
The steps to get there should diminish the security of no nation, enhance the rule of law, advance cooperative security, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, strengthen the bar against use, and diminish threats. Each step, in itself, must reinforce the goal of elimination and simultaneously make us safer.

Thus, the steps such as bringing the test ban into force, negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty, enhancing IAEA safeguards with additional protocols, and making cuts under the START process irreversible, deeper, and confidently verified, are to be pursued with vigor. But, these important efforts, all consistent with the Resolution 1887 of September 24, 2009 of the Security Council and duties under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are only a portion of the architecture of a nuclear weapons-free world. The most important pillar in this infrastructure is the clarity and cohesion of our collective political will to end using nuclear weapons as a currency of power and begin understanding them for what they really are — extremely dangerous devices created under exigent circumstances in a long gone historical period that serve no good purpose today. Their elimination, as Secretary-General Ban stated, will be a “public good of the highest order.”

The dangers inherent in the actual deployments are not fully appreciated by the public. We live in collective denial of the possibility of computer or human error bringing about the unthinkable. There already have been too many computer errors that nearly led to tragedy; there have even been lost weapons from the inventories of the most organized and responsible nuclear weapons states. It is unrealistic to rely in perpetuity on business as usual to prevent the use of a nuclear weapon by accident or design. Moreover, the ideas and doctrines upon which these expensive deployments depend also serve as impediments to a more secure world. Here are some examples. Extended deterrence increases the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, reinforces their perceived value, challenges the disarmament commitments under the NPT, fragments the world into groups in and out of the normative standards of the NPT and the premises of the UN system, requires the capacity to quickly reverse cuts in the arsenals and reinvigorate the institutions that create and produce nuclear weapons, and even, in the instance of Europe, deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of countries which have declared themselves to be nuclear weapons-free. Counterforce requires sufficient numbers of weapons to preclude bringing all nuclear weapons states into substantial disarmament negotiations in the near future. These doctrines were designed to increase stability during the Cold War. The willingness to use nuclear weapons first requires giving them moral legitimacy. These ideas not only make disarmament progress difficult, they also give the veneer of moral propriety to the weapons. Ideas matter, doctrines must change.
We have before us several routes:

• One is to continue to extol the abstract virtue of a nuclear weapons-free world and only pursue the incremental arms control steps that have already begun to their completion and then see what’s next.

• A better choice would be to promptly make clear that the only value a nuclear weapon has is to prevent it ever being used, that less is better and none is best. This posture of existential deterrence of course can only be an interim step. It must include a no first use pledge embodied in a formal Security Council resolution, but even this is a dangerous doctrine and cannot be a finalized norm. If powerful states still require nuclear weapons to deter their use against them why would a weak state in a dangerous neighborhood not invoke the same rationale to develop the weapon?

• The best route is to embody in law the norm against any use that has prevailed since Nagasaki. That could be done in a convention that renders use unacceptable but carefully builds the confidence in verification, monitoring, dismantlement, and all the other threat-reducing steps, into a cooperative law governed process. Secretary-General Ban put this route as his first principle in his five point agenda and circulated a model treaty to advance this route.

The argument against a convention is that it is premature and that the political and security environment is not ripe yet. If so, then we must evaluate policies and doctrines in light of what will make the environment appropriate for a convention, much as we have done with chemical and biological weapons. In fact, even if one only accepts the interim step of minimalizing deterrence as part of the process of zero then we must still have standards and criteria for evaluating policies based on the compass point of elimination.

There are several policies which must be formally and promptly rejected. These include the weaponization of space, modernization and expansion of arsenals, doctrines that perpetuate the reliance on nuclear weapons to do more than merely prevent their use, large economic allocations and the capacity to test and improve nuclear weapons at a subcritical level, and their characterization as essential to any countries peace and security. We must all make clear to the world that nuclear weapons themselves are more of a problem than any they seek to solve. There are several salient policies which would certainly help the process, such as: strengthen the monitoring and verification system of controlling materials; de-alert the arsenals; bring sub-strategic weapons into negotiations; establish a legal prohibition against the weaponization space; adhere to protocols of nuclear weapons-free zone agreements; destroy non-deployed weapons rapidly; addressing regional security challenges with greater levels of cooperation amongst the P5; increase transparency by the nuclear weapons states; come down to very low numbers promptly; safeguard materials recovered from weapons; reduce delivery systems; and solve the fuel cycle challenge in an equitable fashion; and others, to name a few.

To take these necessary steps, the contagious pursuit of dominance must be cured by the healthy recognition that we live together in one fragile ecosystem and thus must cooperate. As the benefits of the proper uses of technology, science and social organization spread to every region, the pursuit of dominance, regional overreach and hegemony will give way to the establishment of cooperation, democracy, the rule of law, pursuit of our collective environmental and economic stability and a natural diminution of excessive militarization.
Equity brings stability. Inequity brings instability. As the global south comes into its own economically, will those with nuclear weapons, which also have the most power, help establish an equitable security system that seeks to truly protect all, to do so based on the rule of law, and to truly believe in the principles of collective security behind the United Nations system designed to prevent the scourge of war? Its design needs updating for today’s world. It must come to reflect the realities of a developing south. Does this mean changes in the Security Council? Of course. We must make sure the UN succeeds; it is an essential institution and we must make every effort possible to support and strengthen it.
Even with the strongest of disarmament inclinations, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev were unable to make the quantity and quality of progress on the elimination of nuclear weapons that they both sincerely wanted because trust in the capacity of a cooperative model, an equitable model, a collective model of security did not then exist. Progress was made no doubt and since then very little in addition has been accomplished. The INF Treaty and the START process are certainly worthy of our respect, but so much was missed. They could not overcome the hurdle of the prospect of the destabilizing factors of the sword and shield of missile defense and the prospect of US unilateral space weaponization. But behind these policy problems was fear that the Cold War could reinvigorate hostilities and mistrust; hedging thus made sense to military planners. Today, behind some military planning is the mistaken belief that a dominance model is still of value. It is not.

It is time to address honestly the dangers of over-militarization, its destabilizing effects and the lost opportunity costs. It is wrong to spend over USD$1.3 trillion a year globally in this pursuit, and it is clearly irrational for the United States to believe that its excessive military expenditures are a reasonable way of pursuing global cooperative and collective security. We can and must do better. The high technology weaponry in huge amounts only stimulates fear and causes others to respond. The world economy has integrated. The climate requires we all work together. Policies that rest on one dominating all are simply no longer reasonable.

By Jonathan Granoff, PNA Advisor, and President, Global Security Institute.  This was delivered at the 10^th Conference of Nobel Laureates in Berlin this month.  Published with permission.

PNA commends the work of our partner organization, which has served as a resource to the Nobel laureates organization for several years.

On Monday, November 9, the Obama administration officially accepted North Korea’s invitation to hold bilateral talks with the isolated country. The State Department has not yet announced the date of these talks but they will most likely follow Obama’s trip to Asia. Stephan Bosworth, the special representative for North Korea, will go to Pyongyang to meet with top North Korea officials to discuss reviving the six-party talks. North Korea left the six-party talks early this year following the United Nations condemnation of its April 5 firing of its Taepodong-2 rocket over the Sea of Japan. The six-party talks, which include the United States, South Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and North Korea, began in 2003 following North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Profileration Treaty (NPT). The talks aim to find a peaceful resolution to the region’s foremost security concern: the North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

The decision came right before President Obama’s weeklong trip to Asia. The President will be visiting four countries in East and Southeast Asia. Obama will first travel to Japan where he and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama plan to issue a joint statement calling for a world without nuclear weapons. From there he will attend an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Singapore, then to China to meet with Chairman Hu Jintao, and finally to South Korea. Some of the major talking points will be U.S.-Asia trade relationships, and North Korea.

As this story continued to unfold, more chapters were written when a North Korea patrol ship and a South Korean warship exchanged fire along a disputed western sea border on Tuesday, November 10^th. The sea skirmish added tension between North Korea and the United States prior to the President’s trip to Asia and Ambassador Bosworth’s mission to Pyongyang. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton announced at a press conference in Singapore that diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff with North Korea will continue despite the dispute.

On November 6, Jeffrey Bader, the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asian Affairs on the National Security Council, announced at the Brookings Institution that the United States is willing to hold bilateral talks with the North Koreans. Mr. Bader stated: “The Obama Administration believes it is better to hear directly from others, including adversaries, than to hear from them secondhand through a filter, but we are not in talks for talks’ sake.” Bader emphasized that these unilateral talks will still be in the context of the six-party talks but they indiciate a shift in U.S. negotiating tactics with the North Koreans. This will be the first time since President Obama took office that a special envoy will meet with the North Koreans directly.

A week prior to the decision to send the special envoy, North Korean officials warned the Obama administration that North Korea is “ready to go our own way” with its nuclear program if bilateral talks do not being soon.  Ri Gun, North Korea Foreign Ministry’s top U.S. official, told the North Korean state run news media that in order to achieve a nuclear-free Korean peninsula the United States and North Korea must first end their hostile relationship.  The North Koreans since the Obama Administration has taken office have been especially aggressive. On May 25, the North Koreans tested a nuclear weapon equal to the size of the Hiroshima bomb.

Despite these difficult circumstances, optimism for U.S. diplomacy should still exist. The big questions concerning U.S.-Korea relations such as, “What is needed to denuclearize the Korean Pennisula?” and, “Strategically what policies are needed by the U.S. administration to end the Korean War of 1950–1953, which has never formally ended?” remain critical. However, the Obama administration’s commitment to diplomacy by offering to hold bilateral talks seems like a step in the right direction. During the 2008 Presidential Election Campaign Senator Obama and Senator McCain often debated whether the United States should engage in direct negotiations with countries such as Iran or North Korea. Following his inauguration, President Obama has stood firm on his promise to engage directly with countries. If the special envoy is successful in negotiating the North Koreans back to the six-party talks, perhaps this model of U.S. diplomacy would also be successful in negotiations with other countries such as Iran. Though the media often depicts the situation with North Korea in a gloomy light, the Administration’s decision to meet unilaterally with North Korea should spark some optimism for U.S. policy in Northeast Asia.

Photo Courtesy of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

Dr. Hans Blix, President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (2006-2009) and former director of the IAEA, wrote an op-ed, published in print on October 26th exclusively by the Inquirer.  Here’s an excerpt–to continue reading, follow the link below:

“Today, with Iran and other states in the Middle East moving into nuclear activities, the zone idea has new appeal. For Iran, giving up enrichment within the framework of a zone would be different from acting unilaterally.  It could contribute to a broader goal of regional disarmament and nonproliferation.

“I do not underestimate the problems, such as verification or of outside assurances of security and supply of uranium fuel. Yet, if the Obama administration is serious about nonproliferation and disarmament, a bold, broad approach is needed. The problem is difficult, but by no means insoluble.”

The Philadelphia Inquirer, “To succeed with Iran, push a nuke-free zone”…

(RightLivelihood.org)

In all the hoopla surrounding President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize, another visionary and activist for peace quietly received a momentous award for his work in nuclear disarmament around the world. Alyn Ware, global coordinator for the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, was one of five recipients for the Right Livelihood Award, often called the “Alternative Nobel Prize”.

Like President Obama, Ware was recognized for his work in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, for several reasons.  One, Alyn was instrumental in the organization of the World Court Project. This Project brought together NGOs to campaign for the International Court of Justice to hear a case on the question of whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was illegal under international law. The court decided that yes, the threat or use of nuclear weapons was generally illegal under international law. But the Court also ruled that nuclear nations had the obligation under international law to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Against all odds, and a great deal of governmental pressure to prevent this case from reaching the Court, the World Court Project, which brought together groups such as the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, LCNP, and a number of European groups,  succeeded in a legal victory against nuclear weapons.

Alyn Ware did not stop there. He organized the drafting of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention, and continues to campaign for this Convention, which would eliminate and ban all nuclear weapons just as biological and chemical weapons have been banned. And in 2002, Ware founded the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, a group that bridges the gap between NGOs and government leaders to find the path to global zero.

Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation has reached center stage, and Alyn Ware and his affiliated groups– which include PNA, the Project for Nuclear Awareness– are a huge force behind this movement. His work with students, government leaders, lawyers, and activists at all levels signifies him as a tireless leader and promoter of peace and a nuclear-weapons free world.

The Project for Nuclear Awareness is proud and honored that Alyn Ware, 2009 recipient of the Right Livelihood Award, will be our keynote speaker on the second day of our International Youth Dialogue for Disarmament. Participants from all over the world will benefit from hearing from this global leader for nuclear disarmament.